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NOTE
Toward Greater Guidance: Reforming the
Definitions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Matthew W. Muma*
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 is the cornerstone of the United
States’ efforts to combat the involvement of U.S. companies and individuals in
corruption abroad. Enforced by both the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the Act targets companies
and individuals that pay bribes to “foreign officials,” a nebulous category of
persons that includes everyone from foreign cabinet members to janitors at
companies only partially owned by a foreign state. After only sporadic enforcement in the early years of the Act’s existence, the SEC and DOJ now bring
many cases annually. This increased enforcement has raised the ire of the
business community, and many commentators have criticized the government
for haphazard enforcement and unclear guidance. The definition of “foreign
official,” which has always been deliberately broad and vague, has particularly
vexed many companies. This Note proposes a creative amendment to the Act
to solve this problem, not by changing the definition of “foreign official” but by
requiring in-country State Department employees to provide country-specific
guidance on who is—and who is not—a bona fide “foreign official” in a given
place.

Table of Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1338
I. Definitional Problems Bundled into the Current
FCPA Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1342
A. The FCPA’s Definitions: Vagueness and a Lack of
Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1342
B. Judge-Made Common Law Is Unlikely to Bring Clarity . . . . 1345
II. The Current FCPA Regime Has Negative Foreign
Policy Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1347
A. The Law Risks Unfairly Punishing Smaller Entities . . . . . . . . 1347
B. Perverse Incentives Create a Real Risk of “Sham
Compliance” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1348
C. The Black Knight Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1350
D. Other Proposed Solutions Are Ineffective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1351
* J.D. Candidate, May 2014, University of Michigan Law School. I would like to thank
Professor Timothy Dickinson, Professor Vikramaditya Khanna, Benjamin Cavataro, David
Frisof and the Michigan Law Review Notes Office, and the whole sick crew for their support
throughout the process.

1337

1338

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 112:1337

III. Amending the FCPA: State Department CountrySpecific Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1353
A. State Department Country-Specific Guidance Inspired by
the Tate Letter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1354
1. Sovereign Immunity and the Tate Letter . . . . . . . . . . . . 1354
2. A Proposal for State Department Guidance in the
FCPA Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1356
B. Potential Problems with Country-Specific Guidance
Rebutted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1360
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1361
Introduction
Between 2001 and 2004, Joel Esquenazi and Carlos Rodriguez paid kickbacks to two employees of the Haitian Telecommunications Company, Telecommunications d’Haiti S.A.M. (“Haiti Teleco”).1 Esquenazi and
Rodriguez’s Miami-based telecommunications company, Terra Telecommunications Corp., had just consummated a joint-venture agreement with Haiti Teleco.2 The duo apparently paid kickbacks to the Haiti Teleco employees
to maintain the relationship and ensure favorable rates.3 The Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) later brought suit against both individuals, alleging that they
violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (“FCPA”), the chief U.S.
law that prohibits U.S. companies, and companies that do business in the
U.S., from bribing foreign governmental officials.4 The DOJ alleged that Haiti Teleco—while perhaps not a traditional component of a national government, like a ministry of foreign affairs or a telecommunications regulatory
body—counted as an instrumentality under the “control[ ]” of the Haitian
government for the purposes of the FCPA.5 The defendants did not deny
committing the underlying acts but instead argued that the FCPA was inapplicable because employees of Haiti Teleco are not “foreign officials” and the
company itself is not a “foreign instrumentality” for purposes of the law.6
The Esquenazi case is a good example of both the FCPA’s reach and the
ambiguities and uncertainties underlying that reach. While it is clear from
the facts of the case that the defendants engaged in unethical business practices, it is not clear whether they knew or should have known they were
bribing a foreign official. Haiti Teleco was an important company in Haiti,
but its ownership structure was ambiguous; at the time, it was not obviously
1. Corrected Brief of Appellant at 13–16, United States v. Esquenazi, No. 11-15331
(11th Cir. argued Oct. 11, 2013), 2012 WL 2087313, at *13–16.
2. Id. at 13–14, 2012 WL 2087313, at *13–14.
3. See id. at 14–16, 2012 WL 2087313, at *14–16. In his brief, Esquenazi argues that in
essence, Haiti Teleco shook down Terra after Terra made substantial investments in Haiti. See
id. at 13–16, 2012 WL 2087313, at *13–16.
4. Id. at 6–7, 26–27, 2012 WL 2087313, at *6–7, *26–27.
5. Brief for the United States at 6, 19–20, Esquenazi, No. 11-15331, 2012 WL 3638390,
at *6, *19–20.
6. Corrected Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 25–27, 2012 WL 2087313, at *25–27.
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or wholly owned by or under the control of the government.7 In their briefs,
both defendants claimed, in fact, that the company was not so owned and
that even if it was majority owned by the Haitian government, the company
was never really in the control of the government or directly used to further
its goals.8 The Esquenazi case is therefore emblematic of several problems
that have haunted FCPA enforcement in the last decade.
Congress passed the FCPA in 1977, after Watergate and revelations of
corrupt payouts to foreign officials by employees of several American companies, including Northrop Grumman and Exxon Mobil.9 The FCPA
criminalizes two distinct practices: first, it makes it illegal for a U.S. company or its agent to bribe a “foreign official” who works for an “agency[ ] or
instrumentality” of a foreign state for the purpose of “securing any improper advantage”;10 second, it requires companies that are publicly traded
in the United States, and thus registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”), to keep accurate accounting records.11
In passing the FCPA, Congress was attempting to ensure that U.S. companies did not engage in bribery overseas because it found bribery both
“unethical” and “bad business.”12 From the start, the FCPA’s goal was to
have both foreign and domestic importance. It encouraged American companies to behave well abroad at least partly under the assumption that they
would then be less likely to behave badly at home.13 After 1977, however, the
FCPA languished for nearly twenty years, with only “sporadic” enforcement.14 The DOJ considered prosecution to be a foreign policy risk.15 Enforcement actions began to rise only with the end of the Cold War16 and
then soared to even greater numbers after the turn of the millennium.17
In many ways, this development has been salutary. Many more companies now have compliance programs, and U.S. firms that operate abroad
7. See Reply Brief of Appellant Carlos Rodriguez at 1, Esquenazi, No. 11-15331, 2012
WL 4901338, at *1.
8. Id.; Corrected Brief of Appellant, supra note 1.
9. Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 33
N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 83, 87 (2007).
10. FCPA § 104, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2012).
11. FCPA § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2). This Note will primarily focus on the antibribery provisions, to which there is one key exception: facilitation or “grease” payments to a
public official are not crimes as long as these payments were made only to expedite “a routine
governmental action.” 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b).
12. H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, at 4 (1977).
13. See S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 4 (1977) (“A strong anti-bribery law is urgently needed . . .
to restore public confidence in the integrity of the American business system.”).
14. Krever, supra note 9, at 93.
15. Id.
16. Padideh Ala’i, The Legacy of Geographical Morality and Colonialism: A Historical Assessment of the Current Crusade Against Corruption, 33 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 877, 903 &
n.126 (2000).
17. Cortney C. Thomas, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of Rapid Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 Rev. Litig. 439, 449 (2010).
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today face pressure to avoid local extortion.18 The extent of international
bribery is extremely hard to quantify19: it is possible, for example, that the
rising number of cases in recent years is simply evidence that the authorities
are discovering more instances of bribery. Overall, however, criminalizing
bribe giving by U.S. companies and those companies doing business in the
United States has probably benefited U.S. foreign policy while furthering
Congress’s aims in passing the Act.20 Bribery is almost universally acknowledged as a net negative for the world economy: laws that uncover and deter
it are advantageous in the long run.21 Outside of more extreme conservative
think tanks, the FCPA—or at least the law’s motivating idea—enjoys wide
support.22
Yet the language of the statute has fallen behind its use. The last FCPA
amendment was in 1998, and that amendment brought the FCPA in more
complete accordance with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (“OECD”)’s 1997 antibribery convention, an international
agreement seeking to curtail bribery worldwide.23 But the amendment, at
the time essentially an academic exercise because the FCPA had basically lain
dormant since its enactment, did very little to address the underlying vagueness in the definitions.24 Given this vagueness, the DOJ has adopted an expansive interpretation of both “foreign official” and “instrumentality.”25
18. See Dan Harris, Bribery in China as a Waste of Money, China Law Blog (July 12,
2012), http://www.chinalawblog.com/2012/07/bribery-in-china-as-a-waste-of-money.html
(urging compliance as sound business strategy).
19. Carl Pacini, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Taking a Bite Out of Bribery in International Business Transactions, 17 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 545, 551 (2012).
20. David Kennedy & Dan Danielson, Busting Bribery: Sustaining the Global
Momentum of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 19–20 (2011), available at http://www
.harvardiglp.org/wp-content/uploads/The-Foreign-Corrupt-Practices-FINAL.pdf. The FCPA
can affect any company that does business in the United States and has indeed affected foreign
companies and even bribery of foreign officials by foreigners. In practice, then, the FCPA can
have extreme extraterritorial reach.
21. See, e.g., Elizabeth Spahn, Nobody Gets Hurt?, 41 Geo. J. Int’l L. 861, 862–64 (2010).
But see Seth Kaplan, Is Corruption Always Bad?, Global Dashboard (Mar. 9, 2012), http://
www.globaldashboard.org/2012/03/09/is-corruption-one-word-or-many/.
22. Compare Walter Olson, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Clarification Is Not Enough,
CATO Inst. (Nov. 11, 2011, 7:49 AM), http://www.cato.org/blog/foreign-corrupt-practicesact-clarification-not-enough, with Mike Koehler, Friday Roundup, FCPA Professor (Nov. 18,
2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-19 (in which an overall critic of the current FCPA enforcement regime argues against Olson’s position).
23. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366,
112 Stat. 3302 (amending the FCPA); Krever, supra note 9, at 88. It is worth noting, however,
that the FCPA was itself one of the inspirations for the OECD pact.
24. Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 Ga. L. Rev. 489, 497–98 (2011) (arguing that
the FCPA’s definitions remain too vague, frustrate the Act’s purpose, and foster uncertainty
about both legitimate and illegitimate business relations).
25. Id. at 533–34.
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Despite vocal opposition from businesses and lobbying groups,26 the DOJ
has interpreted both terms broadly enough to potentially include foreign
officials of all stripes, from the lowest janitor to a governmental minister.
According to the DOJ, an employee who works for a state-owned or statecontrolled enterprise, and not for the government itself, may be a “foreign
official.”27 Indeed, the SEC at one point defined state-owned enterprises to
include institutions less than half-owned by the relevant government.28 The
current enforcement regime may cost U.S. companies millions annually.29
Because the FCPA affects a vast number of companies and has a large effect
on the global economy, its definitions and workability remain points of
controversy.
Various reforms have been proposed. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce
has taken the lead in proposing revisions that would substantially weaken
the law—for example, by introducing a de jure compliance defense, by allowing companies to escape prosecution if they show that employees circumvented reasonable in-house compliance programs, or by eliminating
successor liability when companies merge or purchase new subsidiaries.30
While few commentators have yet called for the law’s repeal, the idea has
occasionally been floated.31
This Note argues that Congress should amend the FCPA to authorize
Foreign Service officers to specify the identities of both “foreign officials”
and “instrumentalities” of foreign governments. Such an amendment would
ensure that the FCPA reflects U.S. foreign policy goals, make FCPA enforcement more attentive to cultural differences, and increase all-around compliance and buy-in. Part I argues that the Act’s definitions of “foreign official”
and “instrumentality” are too vague, and it focuses on both the DOJ and
26. E.g., U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, Restoring Balance: Proposed
Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 24 (2010) [hereinafter Restoring
Balance], available at http://openairblog.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/us-chamber-of-commamending-the-fcpa.pdf. The chamber argues that it is often unclear whether a given individual
or entity is actually under the control of or part of a foreign government.
27. See AGA Medical Corporation Agrees to Pay $2 Million Penalty and Enter Deferred
Prosecution Agreement for FCPA Violations, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (June 3, 2008), http://www
.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/June/08-crm-491.html.
28. See Mike Koehler, Deep Within Its Section 1504 Final Rules, the SEC Adopts an FCPA
Reform Proposal Advanced by the Chamber and Contradicts an Enforcement Theory at Issue in
Several of Its Prior FCPA Actions, FCPA Professor (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor
.com/deep-within-its-section-1504-final-rules-the-sec-adopts-an-fcpa-reform-proposal-ad
vanced-by-the-chamber-and-contradicts-an-enforcement-theory-at-issue-in-several-of-itsprior-fcpa-actions (noting that the SEC instituted a majority ownership requirement only after
the passage of the Dodd–Frank Act).
29. Ashby Jones, FCPA Inc.: The Costs of Compliance Grow, Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 2012, at
B4.
30. Restoring Balance, supra note 26, at 11–14.
31. See, e.g., James Surowiecki, Invisible Hand, Greased Palm, New Yorker (May 14,
2012), http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2012/05/14/120514ta_talk_surowiecki. But
see Richard L. Cassin, Would the Tea Party Repeal the FCPA?, FCPA Blog (Sept. 20, 2010, 8:08
AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2010/9/20/would-the-tea-party-repeal-the-fcpa.html.
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SEC’s lack of real guidance and the federal courts’ inability to adequately
address the problem. Part II urges that this current trajectory has negative
implications for commerce and for U.S. foreign policy: the current regime
disproportionately harms smaller enterprises; encourages expensive sham
compliance by larger companies; and even fosters a “Black Knight Problem”
in which less scrupulous countries and companies fill the vacuum left when
U.S. companies avoid developing countries for fear of FCPA liability. Section
II.D then addresses three other proposed solutions and explains why they
are inadequate. Finally, Part III proposes that Congress amend the FCPA to
require the State Department to craft evolving country-specific guidance to
more precisely designate both foreign officials and instrumentalities, a solution inspired by the Tate Letter regime that preceded the passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) of 1976.
I. Definitional Problems Bundled into the Current FCPA Regime
The definitions in the FCPA are vague and problematic, and contemporary judicial interpretation is not helping matters. Section I.A argues that the
terms “foreign official” and “instrumentality” are too vague to be useful for
companies going forward and that recent DOJ efforts to provide guidance
fall short. Section I.B argues that a judicial, common law approach to the
problem is unlikely to produce optimal results.
A. The FCPA’s Definitions: Vagueness and a Lack of Guidance
In any given country, it is exceedingly difficult to determine exactly
which institutions are “instrumentalities” and exactly who is a “foreign official.” Given the FCPA’s vague language, it is unsurprising that this point has
generated some of the greatest opposition to the current FCPA regime.32 As
many critics have pointed out, applying the FCPA’s definitions domestically
would turn companies partly owned by the U.S. government into instrumentalities and their officers into officials. For example, the American Big
Three automobile manufacturers would have become instrumentalities after
their bailout in 2009.33 Indeed, depending on how one bends the definitions,
there is no clear limit to what can be deemed an instrumentality of the state,
and the DOJ and SEC have kept the definitions as broad as possible.34
This problem is only exacerbated in many developing countries, where
lines between private enterprise and the state are blurry. In China, for example, the Communist Party is inextricably intertwined with all levels of the
32. See Restoring Balance, supra note 26, at 24.
33. See Defendants’ Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Counts One Through Ten
of the Indictment at 21, United States v. Carson, No. 8:09-cr-00077-JVS (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 8,
2009).
34. See Lanny A. Breuer, Ass’t Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Keynote Address to the
Tenth Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory and Compliance Congress and Best Practices Forum
(Nov. 12, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches-testimony/docu
ments/11-12-09breuer-pharmaspeech.pdf.
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economy, and, since 1989, the party has made it a matter of policy that no
one can succeed in China without first going through the party.35 Even Chinese lawyers must swear oaths to the party as opposed to the country itself.36
Above and beyond the problem posed by state-owned enterprises themselves, of which China has many, finding the line where the state ends and
the private economy begins is almost impossible in China.37 Doing business
in the country often entails contacting locals to demand bribes or other
forms of quid pro quo, and the boundaries between the state and the private
sector are hazy.38 Thus, companies doing business in China face a high risk
of violating the FCPA from the moment they enter the country. China is not
the only country with corruption problems, of course; other developing
countries like India, Brazil, and Cambodia also suffer from extreme public
corruption.39 Bribery is a legitimate target, but if the DOJ employed the
current FCPA to anything close to its maximum extent, small companies
would be extremely cautious about entering these developing markets.40
The DOJ stepped in recently to provide some guidance but has in practice done little to clarify the situation—quite possibly because it does not
wish to.41 In November 2012, the DOJ and SEC teamed up to provide a onestop guide to the FCPA. The document lists eleven factors, culled from
courts’ jury instructions, that the DOJ may consider in deciding whether to
prosecute a given case.42 For example, on the question of what constitutes an
“instrumentality,” the DOJ considers the extent to which the foreign state
owns a given foreign entity, how the foreign entity was created, and the
35. Richard McGregor, The Party 36–41 (2010).
36. Edward Wong, Chinese Officials’ Loyalty Oath Requirement Raises Anger Among Lawyers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 2012, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/
world/asia/chinese-lawyers-chafe-at-new-oath-to-communist-party.html.
37. See Bruce J. Dickson, Red Capitalists in China 106–07 (2003); see also Lance
L.P. Gore, The Chinese Communist Party and China’s Capitalist Revolution 2 (2011)
(“[T]he Party has insisted on its organizational presence in all spaces of the Chinese society
deemed politically significant, including business firms and nongovernmental
organizations . . . .”).
38. Dickson, supra note 37.
39. All four countries receive scores under fifty out of a hundred on Transparency International’s annual listing of corruption perception. Corruption Perceptions Index 2013, Transparency Int’l, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
40. See infra Section II.A.
41. See Breuer, supra note 34; see also Jones Day, DOJ/SEC’s Resource Guide to the
U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 7 (2012), available at http://www.jonesday.com/files/
Publication/aea05ebf-c8d9-4c05-82c0-772fe3f0ca78/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/a6ec
97c5-11f0-4e95-adde-6c7e83ce93d3/DOJ%20SEC%20Resource%20Guide.pdf (“Perhaps most
important . . . [is] what the document does not say. Certain questions are . . . left unanswered.
Many of these are matters of judgment while others are areas that the DOJ and SEC simply
chose to leave vague, giving the government the most discretion possible in later enforcement
actions.”).
42. Crim. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Enforcement Div., U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 20 (2012) [hereinafter FCPA Resource Guide], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide
.pdf.
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entity’s provision of services to the state’s residents.43 This guidance does not
expand greatly on what practitioners in the field already know, however, and
it does not substantially clarify the underlying uncertainty in the FCPA’s
definitions. In a memorandum to clients, the law firm Paul Hastings noted
that the new guidance “may create more confusion” and “do[es] not provide
the much-sought clarification for partially state-owned or controlled entities.”44 In sum, the DOJ’s expansive definitions remain vague and unhelpful
for companies doing business abroad.
The FCPA’s punishments are so heavy—the monetary fines, even in settlements, are often in the range of $20–30 million and have reached up to
$800 million—that most companies and individuals faced with prosecution
refuse to risk them.45 Not only are the fines enormous but individual defendants, most of whom have not previously been incarcerated, face jail
time.46 And the DOJ and SEC both actively punish noncompliance; companies faced with possible DOJ investigation are generally quick to settle because the agencies treat fighting the charges as noncompliance.47 The result,
similar to that in the area of U.S. securities regulation, is a dearth of case
law.48 Faced with vague definitions, expansive agency interpretations, and
clear reasons to avoid risking open trial, most companies and individuals
investigated for or charged with FCPA violations settle out of court.
The DOJ itself has begun to release limited specific guidance in the form
of FCPA opinion releases.49 It issues these short documents, upon request, to
entities that have asked for specific but anonymous guidance on who might
be a “foreign official” in a given country. Once it issues the statements, the
DOJ posts them on its website. Unfortunately, these guidance papers are
scarce, slow in coming, and highly general (since they do not name the

43. See id.
44. Paul Hastings LLP, Global Compliance & Disputes Practice Grp., Guidance
on the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act from the Dep’t of Justice and the Securities & Exchange Commission 2 (2012), available at http://www.paulhastings.com/Resour
ces/Upload/Publications/2290.pdf.
45. Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 Geo. J. Int’l L. 907, 924–25
(2010); see, e.g., Plea Agreement at 17, United States v. Bridgestone Corp., No. 4:11-CR-00651
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2011) (fine of $28 million); Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 9, United
States v. Shell Nigeria Exploration & Prod. Co., No. 4:10-CR-00767 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010)
(fine of $30 million); Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html.
46. Koehler, supra note 45, at 940.
47. See id. at 926–29.
48. See Pete J. Georgis, Comment, Settling with Your Hands Tied: Why Judicial Intervention Is Needed to Curb an Expanding Interpretation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 42
Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 243, 278–80 (2012).
49. E.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review, No. 12-01 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice Sept. 18,
2012) [hereinafter Release No. 12-01] (opinion proc. release), available at http://www.justice
.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2012/1201.pdf.
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countries to which they refer).50 Furthermore, the DOJ’s opinion releases
lack the benefit of local expertise. For example, one opinion release refers to
an unspecified “member of the royal family” in an unspecified country.51
The letter details that individual’s responsibilities to the country’s government and concludes—based entirely on information provided by the requesting party (itself not named)—that this particular individual is not a
“foreign official” for FCPA purposes.52 In short, the guidance is inapplicable
to any other situation, which critically reduces its utility. And if anyone tried
to use it as a guide in another situation, it would pose more questions than it
would answer: for example, what about countries where members of the
royal family are not so cleanly dissociated from the state? (And indeed, is
there any such country where the royal family is so cleanly dissociated from
the state?53) These opinion releases create a rebuttable presumption in
court,54 which makes the DOJ unlikely to produce many of them. It is hard
to picture the department successfully prosecuting an entity for its relationship with an individual covered in an opinion release, unless it could show
that the company gave it false information—which would also be difficult,
given the DOJ’s limited manpower and expertise.
B. Judge-Made Common Law Is Unlikely to Bring Clarity
In United States v. Carson, the most recent district court opinion to
reach the “foreign official” question, the District Court for the Central District of California held that the questions of whether an individual qualifies
as a “foreign official” or whether a foreign institution qualifies as an “instrumentality” are questions of fact implicating several distinct inquiries.55 Logical as this approach might seem, however, it only increases uncertainty for
50. Release No. 12-01, supra note 49, at 1. Note the date of the initial request—February
15, 2012—as well as the key phrase “based on the facts as represented by the Requestor.” Id.
The DOJ has only released a total of ten opinions in the last five years. See Opinion Procedure
Releases, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
51. Release No. 12-01, supra note 49, at 1.
52. Id. at 2.
53. For example, in Cambodia, royalty is not easy to sever from the state itself. See Richard S. Ehrlich, Hun Sen Without Royal Check Good News for China, Bangkok Post (Oct. 21,
2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.bangkokpost.com/print/317813. In fact, the same problem is
sometimes even alleged in Britain. See, e.g., Gregory Katz, Breach of Confidence: Don’t Quote
the Queen, Associated Press (Sept. 25, 2012, 1:43 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/breachconfidence-dont-quote-queen.
54. 28 C.F.R. § 80.10 (2013).
55. United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701 (C.D. Cal. May
18, 2011). The Carson court analyzed the following:
The foreign state’s characterization of the entity and its employees;
The foreign state’s degree of control over the entity;
The purpose of the entity’s activities;
The entity’s obligations and privileges under the foreign state’s law, including whether
the entity exercises exclusive or controlling power to administer its designated functions;
The circumstances surrounding the entity’s creation; and
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possible defendants. Under the Carson rule, companies and individuals
working abroad would have to assess both the individuals and institutions
they deal with—or the individuals their employees deal with—in real time,
without a clear sense of whom a court might later find to be a “foreign
official.”56 For example, one of the Carson court’s criteria was “[t]he foreign
state’s degree of control over the entity.”57 Given how entwined the state is
with private enterprise in many countries, it may prove virtually impossible
for a foreign company to ascertain exactly how much control the local government has over any given entity. In fact, this may be the precise problem
in Esquenazi, the Haiti Teleco case.58 The Carson approach, while at least
superficially logical, is no substitute for agency or congressional action clarifying the law.
There is a further risk that under this standard, first the DOJ and then
judges will defer to witness testimony without inquiring whether that testimony is credible on the exact nature of the bribed individual or institution.
The risk is especially serious when the allegations involve wrongdoing overseas. Prosecutors may not have the expertise to judge effectively the structure
of a foreign state or company or determine whether an individual who took
bribes is actually an official under the plain language of the statute. As a
result, prosecutors may pass these factual misunderstandings on to judges
and juries. Circuit courts have yet to reach these particular issues of competence, although the criminal bar is alert to the possibility that fact-heavy jury
instructions may confuse juries.59
In any case, other courts are under no obligation to follow the Carson
approach. For example, Esquenazi is currently pending before the Eleventh
Circuit in Florida,60 and the case may give American companies a new standard to worry about. In any event, a binding judicial solution that creates
settled law in U.S. courts may be some time off, and more confusion looms
as courts continue to take these cases.
The current situation is problematic. On the one hand, the FCPA does
appear to have furthered the U.S. foreign policy goal of reducing American
companies’ involvement in bribery abroad. The FCPA has also served as a
model for foreign codes, like the United Kingdom’s recently passed Bribery
Act.61 On the other hand, it is unclear how effective any of these laws have
The foreign state’s extent of ownership of the entity, including the level of financial support by the state (e.g., subsidies, special tax treatment, and loans).

Id. at *3–4. The court noted that “[s]uch factors are not exclusive, and no single factor is
dispositive.” Id. at *4.
56. It is worth noting that this is only relevant if the company is engaged in some form
of bribery. Under the FCPA, favors to private businesses remain legal while similar favors to
governmental officials do not. Id. at *2.
57. Id. at *3.
58. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
59. Timothy P. O’Toole & Andrew T. Wise, You Mean You’re Really Going to Try an FCPA
Case?, Champion, Sept. 2011, at 26, 26–27.
60. United States v. Esquenazi, No. 11-15331 (11th Cir. argued Oct. 11, 2013).
61. See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23 (U.K.).
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actually been at curbing bribery abroad or whether any of the codes written
outside of Western Europe are actually enforced.62 The business community
in the United States has complained about the FCPA, and the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce is lobbying hard for wide-ranging reforms that might gut it.63
Meanwhile, the definitions in the Act remain unchanged: they are unhelpfully vague and subject to varying interpretations in the courtroom.
II. The Current FCPA Regime Has Negative
Foreign Policy Implications
This Part argues that the current state of FCPA enforcement negatively
impacts U.S. foreign policy. In particular, Section II.A maintains that the
law may lead the DOJ to unfairly target smaller and less sophisticated companies, and Section II.B then argues that a real risk of sham compliance
exists among larger companies, which results in FCPA enforcement that
merely enriches compliance officers and lawyers without actually curbing
bribery. Section II.C argues that the current regime may in fact damage U.S.
interests abroad by creating de facto sanctions on emerging markets that
leave the field open to less scrupulous actors—a result that produces a
“Black Knight Problem.” Finally, Section II.D outlines several other proposed solutions and explains why they are inadequate.
A.

The Law Risks Unfairly Punishing Smaller Entities

Since FCPA enforcement increased drastically in the mid-2000s, the
DOJ and SEC have regularly reiterated that individuals and smaller companies are at risk of investigation and prosecution.64 Going forward, individuals and smaller companies will almost certainly face increasing pressure
under the FCPA.65 While major law firms advocate expensive compliance
programs to alleviate risk, smaller, less sophisticated companies can rarely
afford the full panoply of these protections.66 For example, in 2010, the company Team Inc. “disclosed $3.2 million in professional costs associated with
an FCPA investigation focused on . . . a branch office that represents one62. See, e.g., OECD, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention in Japan (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-bribery
convention/Japanphase3reportEN.pdf (finding that Japan has not been aggressive about putting antibribery laws into practice).
63. Restoring Balance, supra note 26.
64. Lanny A. Breuer, Ass’t Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address to IBC Legal’s World
Bribery & Corruption Compliance Forum (Oct. 23, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/pr/speeches/2012/crm-speech-121023.html.
65. The DOJ has declared that there is no minimum amount to trigger an FCPA violation, although its November 2012 Guidance targets companies of all sizes. See FCPA Resource
Guide, supra note 42, at 8, 57.
66. The international law firm Jones Day lists “ten questions” every director should ask
herself about FCPA compliance; answering the questions with an effective compliance program would not be cheap. See Jones Day, Ten Questions Every Director Should Ask
About FCPA Compliance (2010), available at http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/
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half of one percent of the company’s overall revenue.”67 As a policy matter, it
is both deeply unfair and unnecessary to lock companies out of foreign markets simply because they cannot afford to pay—and it might work to the
detriment of those foreign markets as well. Without the protection of such
compliance programs, the potential fines and jail time create insurmountable risks for smaller companies.
The DOJ and SEC’s November 2012 guidance urges smaller businesses
to turn to Department of Commerce guidance papers to learn about conditions in individual countries.68 As of today, however, the guidance for most
countries consists of little more than boilerplate language concerning the
FCPA and references to the text of the law;69 the guidance is of no real help
in determining whether any given individual or entity is a “foreign official”
or an “instrumentality” of a foreign government. Although the guidance
blithely anticipates that “small and medium-sized” entities will use Department of Commerce resources,70 the program is not well publicized and appears to be mostly ignored by law firms in the business of FCPA compliance.
While a more robust effort by the Department of Commerce to aid smaller
companies doing business abroad would be welcome, it cannot substitute
for more precise, written guidance about foreign states—especially since
Congress has not specifically focused on this problem. Faced with the high
costs of compliance programs and consultation, smaller companies that
wish to operate overseas have access to surprisingly few publicly available
resources. An increasingly robust FCPA regime will almost certainly result in
fewer smaller companies doing business abroad.
B. Perverse Incentives Create a Real Risk of “Sham Compliance”
In the face of the difficulties posed by the FCPA, larger companies have
embraced expensive compliance practices for before and after DOJ or SEC
investigations. These compliance practices, provocatively called “FCPA Inc.”
by some commentators, have been very good for law firms and compliance
officers—and the fines generated by FCPA settlements have been very good
for the DOJ—but all this has come at a heavy cost to companies doing
business overseas.71 And many of these expensive FCPA compliance programs are nothing more than a sham whereby companies spend a great deal
b8f035e6-084c-40ad-a62d-1446eee89829/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/28a5983b-457
b-429d-99b5-bb07be223927/Ten%20Questions.pdf.
67. Mike Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enters a New
Era, 43 U. Tol. L. Rev. 99, 106 (2011).
68. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 42, at 6.
69. See, e.g., U.S. Commercial Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Doing Business in
Cambodia: 2013 Country Commercial Guide for U.S. Companies 39–42 (2013), available
at http://export.gov/thailand/static/2013%20Cambodia%20CCG_Latest_eg_th_063040.pdf.
70. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 42, at 6. I have found no references to the Country Commercial Reports outside of the Resource Guide.
71. Joe Palazzolo, FCPA Inc.: The Business of Bribery, Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 2012, at B1,
available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000087239639044386260457802846229461

May 2014]

Reforming the Definitions of the FCPA

1349

of money on “see-no-evil” compliance programs.72 Indeed, thanks to contemporary diversion instruments such as deferred prosecution agreements
(“DPAs”), many companies may be inching toward treating FCPA compliance measures as something of a tax on doing business abroad as opposed to
a genuine bribery-reducing regulatory regime.73 This expensive, inefficient
system risks locking smaller companies out of developing markets.
Today, the DOJ Fraud Section, which prosecutes criminal FCPA violations, prefers using DPAs and non-prosecution agreements (“NPAs”) to settle a vast majority of cases.74 The DOJ and SEC have extolled the wideranging use of these two devices because they allow prosecutorial discretion
and prevent FCPA charges from becoming death knells for companies.75
Commentators, regulators, and judges have criticized these devices in equal
measure for circumventing judicial review and for introducing an extrastatutory compliance defense.76 In essence, companies do “on-paper-only”
compliance, wait until a problem percolates, and quickly settle.
The extensive use of DPAs and NPAs, as well as the terms commonly
found in these agreements, favors larger companies. These companies can
afford sophisticated legal counsel that can negotiate with DOJ lawyers on
more or less equal terms. Large companies also have the resources to pay for
the broad compliance programs that the DOJ usually demands in exchange—although these programs also may exist more on paper than in

1352; see also Lisa Prager, FCPA Compliance: Don’t Blow Your Budget Just Yet, Forbes (Mar. 27,
2012, 4:18 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2012/03/27/fcpa-compliance-dont-blowyour-budget-just-yet/.
72. See, e.g., Koehler, supra note 45, at 954. In an interview, a former compliance investigator in China said that U.S. companies in China are most comfortable with compliance officers and investigators who provide “enough information that [the company] is not shocked,
but not too much [information],” and that “if [a company] had to actually comply with the
FCPA, the company would not be able to do business in China at all.” Interview with Former
Compliance Investigator (Feb. 12, 2013) (speaking on condition of anonymity).
73. See Koehler, supra note 45, at 933.
74.

[E]very corporate FCPA enforcement action over the last two decades has been
resolved through a DOJ NPA, DPA, plea (or combination thereof) or SEC settlement, and
nearly every individual FCPA enforcement action has been resolved through a plea or
SEC settlement.

Id. at 932.
75.

One need only look at the example of Arthur Anderson, Enron’s accounting firm,
to see the potential repercussions of corporate indictment. When prosecutors approached
the firm with a diversion agreement, it balked, refusing the deal and choosing instead to
risk the litigation route. The damage of the DOJ’s subsequent indictment was “irreversible”—twenty-eight thousand people lost their jobs when the firm crumbled. Even
though Arthur Anderson’s subsequent conviction was later reversed by the Supreme
Court, the harm had already been done—the eighty-nine-year-old firm was out of business and the accounting industry had been transformed from the “Big 5” into the “Big
4.”

Thomas, supra note 17, at 453–54 (footnotes omitted).
76. See, e.g., Koehler, supra note 45, at 935–38.
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reality.77 Smaller players and individuals have fewer resources and are thus at
a disadvantage in this process—and, going forward, prosecutions of smaller
players are likely to increase.78 DPAs and NPAs originally developed in the
field of white-collar crime, directed at large or heavily capitalized companies.79 In this arena, it is relatively unlikely that the targeted institutions will
lack the resources to defend themselves. But in the FCPA universe, where
there is theoretically no limit on how small an operation can be before it
triggers charges, the basic problem of fairness looms much larger.
The result is sham compliance, which occurs when large companies institute costly compliance programs as a necessary component of doing business abroad.80 Although these programs no doubt have some positive effects,
the drawbacks are significant. Not only do they introduce huge fixed costs
into foreign business ventures but they create a real risk of locking smaller
companies out of foreign markets while larger ones enact expensive, “onpaper-only” compliance programs to escape the consequences of violating a
vague and difficult-to-enforce law.
C. The Black Knight Problem
These fixed costs, along with the risk of FCPA prosecution, probably
discourage investment in foreign states with a history of endemic corruption. Professor Spalding argues that this state of affairs harms U.S. foreign
policy goals in two ways: first, it acts as an “unofficial sanction” on developing countries, reducing the engagement of the international business community in these states;81 and second, it creates what Spalding calls a “Black
Knight Problem,” in which states that do not have qualms about operating
in countries with endemic corruption move to fill the gap, exerting their
own influence in the process.82 Recently, China has been the biggest black
77. See Interview with Former Compliance Investigator, supra note 72. The interviewee
detailed how companies generally expected compliance officers to be “judicious” in handling
instances of possible bribery. He described companies seeking enough information to prevent
them from being “shocked” but no more than that. He also noted that more information than
companies wanted to see was often readily available. Id.
78. See Lanny A. Breuer, Ass’t Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address to the 22d National Forum on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 17, 2009), available at http://www
.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches-testimony/documents/11-17-09aagbreuer-remarks-fcpa.pdf.
79. See Rachel Delaney, Comment, Congressional Legislation: The Next Step for Corporate
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 93 Marq. L. Rev. 875, 881–82 (2009). For more commentary
on DPAs, NPAs, and the nature of the targeted companies, see Jed S. Rakoff, U.S. Dist. Judge,
Speech at the N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n: Why Have No High Level Executives Been Prosecuted in Connection with the Financial Crisis? (Nov. 12, 2013), available at http://im.ft-static.com/content/
images/cb1e43f2-4be6-11e3-8203-00144feabdc0.pdf.
80. See Koehler, supra note 45, at 1001–05. For some commentary on the nature of sham
compliance, see Jeffrey M. Kaplan, Compliance ‘Half Measures’ and the Ghost of Christmas Yet
to Come, FCPA Blog (Dec. 20, 2010, 6:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2010/12/20/
compliance-half-measures-and-the-ghost-of-christmas-yet-to-c.html.
81. Andrew Brady Spalding, Four Unchartered Corners of Anti-Corruption Law: In Search
of Remedies to the Sanctioning Effect, 2012 Wis. L. Rev. 661, 663–64, 667.
82. Id. at 667.
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knight.83 This should not surprise anyone, for China’s own endemic internal
corruption poses massive FCPA problems.84
This imbalance may be eroding U.S. influence abroad.85 In Southeast
Asia, for example, the United States significantly lags behind China in foreign direct investment; in Cambodia alone, China’s foreign direct investment of more than $1.19 billion in 2011 was ten times that of the United
States.86 The uncertainty created by the FCPA’s vague definitions only exacerbates the challenges for the United States in the global economy.
D. Other Proposed Solutions Are Ineffective
Many scholars have suggested altering the FCPA regime to address the
problems outlined above. This Section describes three proposed reforms: establishing a de jure compliance defense; repurposing the FCPA to focus on
the solicitation of bribes by foreign officials; and creating a new U.S. governmental entity dedicated to foreign corruption. The Section ultimately concludes, however, that these reforms are incomplete solutions that may even
exacerbate the uncertainty surrounding the FCPA.
First, many commentators have argued for a formal compliance defense
to the FCPA.87 Professor Koehler, in particular, argues that adding a compliance defense “as a matter of law” would incentivize companies to adopt
better compliance practices and help the DOJ preserve prosecutorial resources for truly egregious cases.88 Under a compliance-defense regime,
companies would see reduced liability if they could demonstrate to the DOJ

83. Id.
84. See Ernst & Young, Growing Beyond: A Place for Integrity 22–23 (2012),
available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Global-Fraud-Survey-a-place-for-in
tegrity-12th-Global-Fraud-Survey/$FILE/EY-12th-GLOBAL-FRAUD-SURVEY.pdf (surveying
corruption compliance issues in China).
85. It should be noted, however, that the question of whether the FCPA primarily harms
U.S. companies has provoked cycles of intellectual skirmishing. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has repeatedly claimed that the FCPA unfairly harms the foreign actions of American
companies. Restoring Balance, supra note 26, at 24. Government critics have answered that
nine of the largest FCPA penalties have been levied against companies not headquartered in
the United States. E.g., J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks Before the
Forum for EU–US Legal-Economic Affairs 6–7 (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/
rosch/120913FCPAenforcement.pdf.
86. See Andrew R.C. Marshall & Prak Chan Thui, Insight: China Gambles on Cambodia’s
Shrinking Forests, Reuters (Mar. 7, 2012, 8:31 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/
07/us-cambodia-forests-idUSTRE82607N20120307 (“China has . . . been generous with aid,
pledging more than $2 billion since 1992 . . . .”); see also Jonathan Weston et al.,
U.S.–China Econ. & Sec. Review Comm’n, China’s Foreign Assistance in Review (2011),
available at http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/9_1_%202011_ChinasFor
eignAssistanceinReview.pdf.
87. See, e.g., Mike Koehler, Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense,
2012 Wis. L. Rev. 609.
88. Id. at 611–12 (emphasis omitted).
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that they had instituted a “good faith” compliance program before discovering corruption.89
But Koehler’s own work raises problems with this approach. First, many
compliance programs, as they currently operate, create “on-paper-only”
compliance.90 The creation of a formal compliance defense may simply encourage expensive sham compliance as a form of good faith compliance efforts. Second, as Koehler and others have demonstrated, the DOJ’s
preference for DPAs and NPAs creates a de facto compliance defense in any
case.91 Perhaps most importantly, instituting a compliance defense would
only perpetuate the problem this Note’s proposed solution seeks to ameliorate: instead of incentivizing the DOJ to be more precise in its enforcement,
a compliance defense would simply motivate companies to create large local
compliance programs designed less to root out corruption than to deceive
the DOJ, which lacks the cultural competence to assess adequately these programs’ efficacy.92
Professor Klaw argues for decriminalizing the giving of bribes but
criminalizing the solicitation or extortion of bribes by governmental officials.93 According to Klaw, the current FCPA regime creates “perverse incentives,” encouraging companies to hide incidents of bribery and extortion
and thus preventing the market from taking into account the true costs of
bribery.94 To have the proper deterrent effect, he argues, companies should
have to disclose extortion abroad, and the U.S. government should prosecute
foreign officials who demand bribes if their home governments are unwilling or unable to hold them accountable.95 The jurisdictional extension this
would entail is not without constitutional merit.96
But there is simply no practical way that the government could actually
bring enough foreign officials before U.S. courts for the law to have any
deterrent effect.97 Furthermore, such an aggressive stance would almost certainly damage U.S. relations with regimes around the world. The switch in
89. See id. at 618.
90. See supra Section II.B.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 74–76.
92. See Interview with Former Compliance Investigator, supra note 72; supra note 77.
93. Bruce W. Klaw, A New Strategy for Preventing Bribery and Extortion in International
Business Transactions, 49 Harv. J. on Legis. 303 (2012) (arguing for a reversal of the FCPA
regime whereby laws criminalizing the paying of bribes give way to laws targeting those who
extort them).
94. See id. at 305, 319–20, 337.
95. Id. at 361–62.
96. Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations” and “define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations.”
U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cls. 3, 10; see also Klaw, supra note 93, at 363 (citing United States v.
Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 835 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)).
97. The behavior of Argentina’s governmental officials in the face of U.S. court rulings is
instructive: the officials of sovereign states are generally disinclined to kowtow before foreign
courts. See infra note 116.
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criminalization would be exceedingly difficult to implement—it would involve reversing decades of national and international lawmaking—and
would have a definite negative impact on enforcement.
All of these changes to the FCPA would solve problems only by making
it harder for the DOJ to bring cases in the first instance, even if the department felt that the facts in a given case might warrant prosecution. Almost all
of the solutions would severely limit the DOJ’s discretion but would provide
no countervailing aid to the global antibribery regime. By and large, the
one-size-fits-all approach would simply weaken the law, not improve it.
Adopting a similar approach to the one advocated by this Note, some
scholars have proposed reforms that address the lack of coordination between different governmental entities charged with conducting U.S. foreign
policy. For example, Spalding suggests creating a new governmental entity
empowered with “formal legal authority to participate in the design and
implementation of anti-corruption policy.”98 As a longer-term solution,
sketched at a very high level, this is a reasonable proposal. But it runs into
practical problems that would make it hard to implement. It would be difficult to force meaningful cooperation between governmental units with different, and potentially conflicting, mandates.99 By contrast, a modified form
of country-specific guidance, as described below, would produce greater
rapprochement between the DOJ and the State Department. Indeed, such
guidance would not rely on de jure coordination between departments with
conflicting goals, prerogatives, and competencies, which would increase the
likelihood of positive results in the near term.
III. Amending the FCPA: State Department
Country-Specific Guidance
The current FCPA enforcement regime is unwieldy and unpredictable
and may result in both underenforcement and overenforcement. In light of
these concerns, this Note proposes a unique solution: amending the FCPA to
require the State Department to define “foreign official” and “instrumentality” for each country, with these definitions creating a rebuttable presumption in court. This proposal would render FCPA enforcement more
predictable; enable the State Department to tailor the FCPA’s application in
specific countries to U.S. foreign policy goals; take advantage of the expertise
98. Spalding, supra note 81, at 687.
99. DOJ’s Fraud Section is known for its highly prosecutorial culture. Id. at 681. The
State Department asserts that its mission is to “fight terrorism, protect U.S. interests abroad,
and implement foreign policy initiatives while building a freer, prosperous and secure world.”
Mission, U.S. Dep’t of State: Careers Representing America, http://careers.state.gov/
learn/what-we-do/mission (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). In addition, the State Department’s official mission statement is to “[c]reate a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the
benefit of the American people and the international community.” Mission, U.S. Dep’t of
State, http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/23503.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
None of these missions involves enforcing U.S. laws—or indeed taking U.S. laws into account
at all—except in the most indirect fashion. Id.
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of in-country Foreign Service officers; and aid companies in making compliance decisions. In short, State Department guidance memoranda would be a
first step to a more transparent and efficient FCPA regime. Section III.A
outlines this proposal in more detail, in part by comparing it to its inspiration: the State Department’s guidance under the Tate Letter regime prior to
the passage of the FSIA. Section III.B then anticipates the proposal’s potential weaknesses and limitations and responds to them.
A.

State Department Country-Specific Guidance Inspired by the Tate Letter

In the near term, the United States can avoid some of the negative effects of the FCPA’s unclear definitions without actually amending the definitions in the underlying statute or otherwise dramatically altering its purpose
and scope. The State Department is already in a position to provide concrete
support that will aid companies.100 Specifically, Congress should amend the
FCPA to require in-country State Department officials to author countryspecific guidance that, if followed by U.S. companies, would serve as a rebuttable presumption of FCPA compliance in the event of prosecution.
While this situation might seem somewhat unusual, the State Department has previously issued guidance that substantially determined a party’s
liability in court. Prior to the passage of the FSIA, the State Department
authored recommendations regarding sovereign immunity under the Tate
Letter regime.101 Although this earlier regime was largely ineffective, important differences in the sovereign immunity context make success much more
likely under the FCPA. Section III.A.1 explains the structure of the Tate Letter regime, its perceived failings, and the reasons that the FSIA replaced it. In
light of these findings, Section III.A.2 describes the details of the proposed
country-specific FCPA guidance and explains how this guidance solves the
FCPA’s current problems while avoiding the pitfalls of the Tate Letter
regime.
1. Sovereign Immunity and the Tate Letter
In 1938, the Supreme Court decided Compania Espanola de Navegacion
Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, which recognized that courts were bound by
State Department suggestions regarding the sovereign immunity status of
foreign states because the judiciary should defer to the executive on issues of

100. In the November 2012 guidance, the DOJ and SEC already urge “U.S. businesses to
seek the assistance of U.S. embassies when they are confronted with bribe solicitations or other
corruption-related issues overseas.” FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 42, at 6.
101. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Interpreting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Reading or
Construing the Text?, 15 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 555, 560 (2011).
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foreign policy.102 But the State Department did not release any written guidance until 1952, when Jack B. Tate, legal adviser to the department, authored a letter to the acting attorney general. The letter set out the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity that the State Department felt the courts
should adopt.103 This theory of sovereign immunity holds that a sovereign
enjoys immunity when acting as a state but not when engaged in everyday
commercial activity. The State Department then occasionally intervened in
specific instances when questions of sovereign immunity came before the
courts.104 Although The Navemar and the Court’s subsequent decisions had
decided only that such guidance should be binding as to specific cases,
“Courts accepted the Tate Letter as a general suggestion, binding them to
decide cases according to the restrictive immunity theory set forth in
the Tate Letter even when the Department refused to make a specific
suggestion.”105
While theoretically sound, this regime, in which courts relied on the
theory articulated in the Tate Letter and on the rare specific recommendations from the State Department, suffered from two practical problems
unique to the sovereign context. First, while the Tate Letter identified different legal effects for the public and private acts of sovereigns, it did not articulate an easily applicable method to distinguish one from the other.106 Thus,
the Tate Letter did not provide sufficient guidance in situations where a
“State Department determination did not control the outcome,” or, in other
words, where the State Department had not made a specific suggestion.107
Second, when the State Department did make specific recommendations regarding sovereign immunity, they were heavily politicized, usually requesting favorable treatment for Cold War allies that had been haled into court.108
Ultimately, the State Department was incapable or unwilling to give frequent guidance, and the guidance it did give was patently politicized and
offered in reaction to pending cases.
102. 303 U.S. 68, 74 (1938). The Navemar and the cases that followed made clear that
courts assumed the State Department would make a recommendation that it would then communicate to the attorney general, who would then communicate the opinion to the courts—
hence the Tate Letter. E.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945); Ex
parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 586–89 (1943).
103. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to Philip B. Perlman,
Acting Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice (May 19, 1952), reprinted in Changed Policy Concerning the
Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Governments, 26 Dep’t. St. Bull. 984 (1952).
104. Ruth Donner, The Tate Letter Revisited, 9 Willamette J. Int’l L. & Disp. Resol. 27,
28, 36–39 (2001).
105. Dellapenna, supra note 101, at 559–60.
106. Donner, supra note 104, at 28.
107. Ved P. Nanda & David K. Pansius, 1 Litigation of International Disputes in
U.S. Courts § 3:3 (2d ed. 2012).
108. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983) (“On occasion,
political considerations led to suggestions of immunity in cases where immunity would not
have been available under the restrictive theory.”); see also Dellapenna, supra note 101, at
560–61.
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These failings spurred Congress to replace the original Tate Letter with
the FSIA in 1976.109 The FSIA codified the Tate Letter’s general restrictive
approach to sovereign immunity, provided a coherent method to differentiate between sovereign and private acts, and removed the State Department
from sovereign immunity determinations.110 The Act eliminated much of the
risk of politicization, particularly the concern that the State Department
would intervene in cases that had already developed. Courts and commentators generally agree that the FSIA brought greater clarity and fairness to
sovereign immunity cases.111 And while the Act has presented many difficulties in application and interpretation, there has been no movement to return
to the old regime.
2. A Proposal for State Department Guidance in the FCPA Context
The FCPA, passed a year after the FSIA, was undoubtedly created under
a similar impulse. Congress would not have acted almost simultaneously to
remove questions of sovereign immunity from State Department control
while placing the fate of its new antibribery law in the hands of the same
executive branch department. While the FSIA has brought coherence and
predictability to the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, the FCPA’s
inherently ambiguous statutory definitions have failed to provide such clarity.112 The immense complexity and variety in economic systems between
countries and the DOJ’s enforcement practices have only exacerbated the
situation.113 To address these issues, this Note proposes replacing the DOJ’s
infrequent and limited opinion-release process with statutorily mandated
country-specific guidance issued by the State Department.
Specifically, in-country Foreign Service officers would prepare guidance
memos identifying what types of individuals and organizations within that
country should be considered “foreign officials” and foreign “instrumentalities” under the FCPA. Updated regularly and available publicly on the internet, this guidance would provide compliant companies with a rebuttable
defense—similar to the compliance defense afforded by the DOJ’s opinion
releases—in the event of DOJ prosecution. A guidance-memo regime would
109. 1 Nanda & Pansius, supra note 107, § 3:3; see also Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976 § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 (2012).
110. 1 Nanda & Pansius, supra note 107, § 3:3. While commentators generally view the
FSIA as an improvement over the previous regime, it is beset by its own problems and might
benefit from similar amendments. See, e.g., Donner, supra note 104, at 36–39; Jonathan C.
Lippert, Vulture Funds: The Reason Why Congolese Debt May Force a Revision of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, N.Y. Int’l L. Rev., Summer 2008, at 1; J.F. Hulston, Note, Chinese
Assault Rifles, Giant Pandas, and Perpetual Litigation: The “Rights Without Remedies” Dead-End
of the FSIA, 77 Mo. L. Rev. 511, 520–521 (2012). Arguments about the reform of the FSIA are,
however, beyond the scope of this Note.
111. See, e.g., Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487–89.
112. See supra Part I.
113. See supra Part I.

May 2014]

Reforming the Definitions of the FCPA

1357

ameliorate many of the FCPA’s policy problems by introducing local expertise, discouraging expensive sham compliance, and checking the DOJ’s ability to strong-arm companies into settling cases without hobbling its ability
to bring worthwhile investigations. The guidance-memo regime would also
avoid many of the Tate Letter’s pitfalls: it is better suited to the world’s diverse political and legal regimes, less susceptible to rank politicization, and
not vulnerable to retroactive politicization.
First, in-country Foreign Service officers are more cognizant than lawyers in Washington, D.C., of local economic and cultural issues, institutional
prerogatives, and overarching U.S. foreign policy goals as applied to their
specific country. As the U.S. officials closest to the action in any given country,114 Foreign Service officers have the training and expertise necessary to
produce these guidance memos. Because the DOJ does not produce the
memos, it would be under no obligation to completely respect them—on
the contrary, the DOJ could still bring any case it thought viable. A defendant, however, could use the memo as detailed guidance at trial, fashioning
something akin to a compliance defense—but one based on an above-board
attempt to act appropriately in a particular country as opposed to the implementation of a (quite possibly sham) compliance program.115 These new,
country-specific guidance memos would require frequent updates, perhaps
once every two years. Furthermore, they would have to be quite specific: the
State Department officers tasked with writing the memos would need to
define who they felt was a “foreign official” and which organizations were
“instrumentalities.”
But why should Congress return, in the FCPA context, to a solution that
did not work in the sovereign immunity context? First of all, in the FCPA
arena the situation is less amenable to a one-size-fits-all solution; indeed, the
FSIA’s central problem is reversed. On questions of sovereign immunity,
other states perhaps dislike that they may be sued in U.S. court for purely
commercial activities, but they can read the law and make competent predictions. On the contrary, because of the worldwide diversity of cultures and
legal systems, the FCPA context does not lend itself to any clear mode of
judicial analysis. The sheer number of countries and unique situations
means that distinctions between private and public are simply too diverse.
Companies therefore incur enormous compliance costs to produce the effect
of paper compliance and guard against risks that are hard to predict. While
the sovereign immunity context was amenable to a one-size-fits-all approach
with a common mode of analysis, the FCPA context is not.
114. With the exception, perhaps, of intelligence officers, who are unsuited to this task
because of the necessary confidentiality of their activities and their use of bribes as a strategic
tool. See, e.g., Matthew Rosenberg, Karzai’s Office Gets Bags Full of C.I.A. Cash, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 29, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/29/world/asia/cia-deliverscash-to-afghan-leaders-office.html?pagewanted=all.
115. See supra Section II.B. The key differences between the two approaches are good faith
and local precision: the compliance defense incentivizes a “see-no-evil” approach to local issues and the mere appearance of compliance, while the Tate Letter regime incentivizes an
open-eyed approach to local entities and relationships.
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Furthermore, removing politics and the State Department from liability
determinations is less beneficial in the FCPA context than in the sovereign
immunity context.116 Sovereign immunity involves foreign states directly,
while the FCPA merely involves them tangentially—as the alleged bribe takers. As such, the risk of political quid pro quos is reduced in the FCPA
context. The FSIA’s fundamental question concerns the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts, while the FCPA’s fundamental question concerns the application of a
U.S. law. Again, state issues are less directly implicated, which mitigates the
concern of undue politicization117 and increases the complexity, since the
number of potential actors is larger and more fluid than the number of the
world’s states. Finally, in the sovereign immunity context, the State Department usually reacted to ongoing cases instead of providing a shield against
potential prosecutions, whereas the State Department guidance proposed
here would furnish ex-ante determination of liability, diminishing the impact of politicization in the FCPA context. Finally, the end of the Cold War
has removed one of the major problems of politicization: the State Department’s tendency to request solicitous treatment for allies regardless of the
underlying merits of the case.118 To the contrary, the contemporary State
Department has a more nuanced set of considerations, including the
strength of the global economy.119
Even so, the guidance-memo regime might appear to merely shift the
lobbying from foreign countries to companies doing business in foreign
countries. But there should be less cause for concern about the increased
power of the State Department and the lobbying risks that such increased
power might initially seem to promote. Foreign Service officers, even senior
ones, serve fairly short terms in each country, before which they undergo
116. Even in the FSIA context this practice is problematic. In the line of cases spawned by
Argentina’s sovereign default, the State Department routinely weighed in on behalf of the
Argentine government—and the Argentine government’s repeated statements of disrespect for
the American court and its rulings have precisely demonstrated the problems inherent in allowing one state to be sued in another state’s courts. In the ongoing Elliot v. Argentina litigation, the Argentine government has come very close to admitting, in open court, that it does
not intend to comply with court orders. See generally Felix Salmon, Elliot vs Argentina: The
Second Circuit’s Dangerous Game, Reuters (Mar. 4, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/felixsalmon/2013/03/04/elliott-vs-argentina-the-second-circuits-dangerous-game/. For an example
of the State Department’s supporting a foreign government in U.S. courts, see Brief for the
United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Republic of Argentina’s Petition
for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d
246 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 12-105-cv(L)), 2012 WL 6777132, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 201 (2013).
117. Since this process implicates large corporations, it could be susceptible to regulatory
capture. This Note sets out below why capture may be less likely than some might fear. See
infra text accompanying notes 120–121.
118. David P. Vandenberg, Comment, In the Wake of Republic of Austria v. Altmann: The
Current Status of Foreign Sovereign Immunity in United States Courts, 77 U. Colo. L. Rev. 739,
745 (2006).
119. See Michael A. Almond & Scott D. Syfert, Beyond Compliance: Corruption, Corporate
Responsibility and Ethical Standards in the New Global Economy, 22 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com.
Reg. 389 (1997).
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intense in-house training.120 To influence the content of the guidance
memos, companies would have to cajole repeatedly new Foreign Service officers. But these officers’ careers depend on in-house evaluations, not thirdparty approval: they are unlikely to be any more susceptible to direct lobbying than any U.S. civil servant at a domestic regulatory agency. Congress
could further shield decisionmakers from interference by insulating them
from the political appointment of ambassadors.121 It is worth noting, however, that questions involving larger companies might invite lobbying at
higher levels, probably directed at ambassadors or at U.S. governmental entities in Washington. In these cases, we may accept a certain degree of
politicization; questions that could cause real lobbying of high officials in
the United States are big enough to qualify as political and foreign policy
questions, and it may be best to have them handled as such, with political
appointees authorized to weigh in on “foreign official” determinations. The
exact mechanics of the regime would take some time to work out, but that
should hardly doom the proposal.
Implemented properly, these guidance memos would help a smaller
company move into a foreign market: the memos would clarify, at least in
general, how the company must behave toward local entities, and they would
do so without entailing massive legal or compliance costs. The guidance approach would greatly clarify the FCPA’s definitions and, finally, would put
the somewhat conflicting mandates of the DOJ and the State Department to
good use.122 By providing defendants with stronger evidence of their compliance, these guidance notes would give defendants better weapons in court
and would dissuade the DOJ from bringing marginal cases.123 At the same
time, this approach would allow the DOJ continued flexibility in prosecutions,124 and the existence of these letters may encourage more defendants to
challenge the DOJ in court, leading to long overdue judicial oversight for
FCPA investigations.
120. Entry-level Foreign Service officers generally serve two-year tours, and more senior
officers usually serve three-year tours. Longer tours are rare, even for very senior officers. See
Eilene Zimmerman, Hiring Window Is Open at the Foreign Service, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 2008,
at BU9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/21/jobs/21officers.html?pagewanted=all;
Is the Foreign Service Right for You?, U.S. Dep’t of State: Careers Representing America,
http://careers.state.gov/officer/is-the-foreign-service-right-for-you (last visited Feb. 23, 2014)
(noting that it is an “absolute requirement” that Foreign Service officers be willing to
“[c]hange jobs and locations every 2–4 years”).
121. Since the guidance memos would provide rebuttable presumptions, courts would
uphold foreign official determinations only if they were actually persuasive. See infra note 124
and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 99.
123. After all, this Note argues that the DOJ’s limited resources and lack of local expertise
mean it is prone to both miss viable cases and to prosecute marginal ones.
124. Faced with a conflict between the two agencies, courts should side with the one they
find more persuasive; this Note assumes that would usually be the State Department, but it
also presumes that courts could choose not to credit a State Department decision if it were
unduly politicized or otherwise unpersuasive.
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B. Potential Problems with Country-Specific Guidance Rebutted
While one might raise several objections to statutorily mandated State
Department guidance for the FCPA, these objections do not defeat the proposal’s viability or efficacy. First, although this solution might appear to
pose a constitutional problem by enabling State Department officials to
“make law,” the guidance falls well within established constitutional principles. Second, guidance memos might seem to create multiple standards
whereas the FCPA only outlines a single, universal standard for foreign business practice; as described above, however, this is in fact a benefit of the
proposal. Lastly, since it is a novel approach, the guidance-memo proposal
might raise feasibility concerns, but Congress and the State Department
could easily address these concerns if they act in good faith. It is worth
noting, however, that the Tate Letter regime is, like the FSIA (and the FCPA
itself), only a partial solution to a problem that may be at least somewhat
intractable. If Congress implements the guidance-memo regime, it must still
modify and monitor it to ensure that it has the intended effect.
The argument that the guidance-memo approach would allow the State
Department to make law is unconvincing. Under contemporary nondelegation doctrine, governmental agencies may generally promulgate regulations
within their area of expertise if Congress delegates to them the authority to
do so, and this Note’s proposal would see Congress delegate that authority
to the State Department.125 The State Department and its Foreign Service
officers already make a good portion of U.S. visa policy, advise other organs
of the U.S. government on foreign affairs, and direct the use of American
resources abroad. The current FCPA is a vague statute—it does not define
who or what is a “foreign official” or “instrumentality” in a given place—
and the State Department is the governmental entity most capable of providing greater insight and direction within the statute’s bounds. The department certainly has greater insight than the DOJ, which is attempting to act
somewhat like the State Department by implementing an Opinion Release
program that creates rebuttable presumptions in court. In short, if Congress
amends the FCPA to include State Department guidance, the memos should
enjoy a status at least equal to the DOJ’s opinion releases—and this status
would easily satisfy the nondelegation doctrine’s need for an intelligible
principle.
Some may also question the feasibility of the guidance-memo regime; in
particular, they may doubt the State Department’s expertise and manpower.
But these concerns are unfounded: Foreign Service officers are already
trained to become experts, within reason, on issues involving the government and the society of the country where they are posted. Giving them the
task of assessing the relations between local entities and the government
125. The Supreme Court recently addressed delegation in Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001), and it concluded that the language “requisite to protect the public
health” provided enough of an intelligible principle to pass nondelegation muster. Id. at 465
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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would add relatively little to their workload.126 Even if the State Department
lacked the resources to implement comprehensive country-specific guidance,
the law could still require guidance for specific regions or situations—for
example, for the role of royalty in the Middle East or that of certain Chinese
companies. This approach would be narrower than the one outlined above,
but its implementation would be cheaper, and it would still achieve the same
effect in those regions most likely to pose tough FCPA questions. And despite the worldwide antibribery trend, the guidance-memo regime would be
politically feasible. Although the contemporary Congress is probably incapable of passing legislative changes, the Republican Party and the Chamber of
Commerce have advocated for far more sweeping changes to the FCPA.127
Given the difficulties outlined in this Note, the changes envisioned by the
proposal should prove no less feasible than the wholesale changes to the
FCPA championed by the U.S. business community.
That said, there are no magic bullets. When foreign states and companies are involved—when transactions cross and re-cross borders—political
and diplomatic pressures will always impinge on the prerogatives of the U.S.
judicial system. Through the FCPA, Congress charted a middle course. The
Act does not ban all forms of foreign bribery: facilitation (or grease) payments and bribes to purely private entities remain legal, but bribery involving a foreign government is verboten.128 A law clearly drafted to criminalize
an activity in certain contexts and not in others deserves nuanced application and expert clarification. Currently, nonexperts apply the law in a shotgun approach and claim, at least theoretically, the legal right to prosecute
nearly every U.S.-based company that does business in certain countries (although in practice the DOJ has stopped well short of doing so). This situation has enriched compliance investigators and lawyers and encouraged
corporate record building without, it seems, greatly influencing behavior on
the ground. A guidance-memo approach would not entirely rid the world of
bribery or resolve the quandaries outlined above, but it at least marks a start
to a clearer, more comprehensible enforcement regime.
Conclusion
The current FCPA regime is deeply problematic, and the unclear statutory definitions of “foreign official” and “instrumentality” have produced
uncertainty and encouraged prosecutorial overreach in applying the law. But
a solution exists: country-specific guidance memos. These memos would
serve as a kind of modern day Tate Letter, tailored to each country and
designed to help companies comply with the FCPA and bring U.S. foreign
policy goals into line with the Act’s enforcement in a transparent manner. A
126. Notably, the State Department must already maintain several foreign policy–related
lists, including the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, the Annual Report on
International Religious Freedom, and a Trafficking in Persons Report. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C.
§§ 2151n(d), 2304(b), 6412(b), 7107(b) 8221, 8222 (2012).
127. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 56.
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strengthened regime that focuses more specifically on individual countries
would address many of the FCPA’s current shortcomings without gutting
the law altogether. It would benefit the United States, companies of all sizes,
and the antibribery regime around the world.

